



To abolish nuclear weapons, strip away their handsome mask 
 
By Mustafa Kibaroglu, December 19, 2016 
 
The golden age of deterrence has reached its end. Nuclear weapons, once a star player 
on the international stage, no longer enjoy a place in the limelight. 
To be sure, some policy makers still ascribe to nuclear weapons the same prestige 
that, during the Cold War, they gained because of their unmatched destructive power 
and the leverage they provided nuclear weapon states in the international arena. But 
the Cold War environment, in which nuclear weapons in the hands of two 
superpowers played a vital role in maintaining strategic stability, doesn’t exist 
anymore. Nor is it likely to be replicated in the future—despite certain parallels 
between US-Soviet relations during the Cold War and present-day US-Russia 
relations. Meanwhile, it is painfully obvious that nuclear deterrence is useless against 
apocalyptic terrorist organizations motivated by religious extremism. If such a group 
acquired and used a nuclear weapon, there would be no “return address” toward 
which retaliation could be directed. And apocalyptic terrorists probably don’t fear 
destruction in the first place. 
Now that the golden age of deterrence has reached its end, banning nuclear weapons 
has become achievable—as long as the values that policy makers ascribe to them can 
be undermined. Now is the time to strip away the handsome mask that hid nuclear 
weapons’ ugly face throughout the Cold War. It’s time for the world to treat nuclear 
weapons just like chemical and biological weapons—those other weapons of mass 
destruction—as mere slaughtering weapons, undeserving of prestige. It is time to ban 
nuclear weapons—just as biological and chemical weapons were banned through the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Why now. Throughout history, weapons have been invented for various reasons, but 
mainly to kill the enemy. If a weapon exists, sooner or later it will be used—
especially if factors that might diminish the probability of its use, such as peace 
treaties, stable political environments, rational leadership, and deterrence 
capabilities—have weakened or disappeared. 
In today’s world and in the foreseeable future, can we count on rational political 
leadership to maintain a stable international environment in which nuclear weapons 
will not be used? It is difficult to answer “yes.” The only reliable way to prevent 
nuclear catastrophe is to ban production of these weapons and eliminate them for 
good. Indeed, given the increasing ability of many states and non-state actors to 
master the scientific knowledge and technological skills necessary to build nuclear 
explosive devices, whether crude or sophisticated, the world will become 
dramatically less safe if nuclear weapons aren’t eliminated soon. The existing 
disarmament and nonproliferation structure hasn’t achieved disarmament yet and 
seems unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. Thus the ban treaty. 
What to include. The question then becomes what a ban treaty should entail. First 
and foremost, it should ensure that states adhering to it enjoy the same rights to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy as are currently enjoyed by non-nuclear weapon 
states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). That is, the basic bargain 
that attracted many states to the NPT—foregoing the option to build nuclear weapons 
in exchange for assistance in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy—should be 
enshrined in the new treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should 
continue its responsibility for assisting states in their nuclear power undertakings. 
Second, the ban treaty should establish an effective verification mechanism—but 
probably not the IAEA as currently constituted. Given that the nuclear weapon states 
will one day have to join the ban treaty if it’s to be successful, the treaty’s verification 
mechanisms can’t be dominated by nuclear weapon states, as the agency is 
dominated today. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) might represent a more useful template. The OPCW has thus far carried out 
its work toward eliminating chemical weapons in a fair, timely, and effective way. 
Third, a ban treaty will transform the entire world into a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
once it becomes universal. Existing zones’ provisions should therefore be a source 
of inspiration to the treaty’s drafters, especially in terms of rights and responsibilities. 
Reasons for optimism. A ban treaty’s chances of achieving disarmament would be 
no worse than the NPT’s chances—maybe better. One factor in the ban treaty’s favor 
is that no country can perceive a legitimate threat from it. The non-nuclear weapon 
states today don’t perceive any threat from the NPT—and if the ban treaty is ever 
universalized, every state will be a non-nuclear weapon state. No nation will be 
capable of bullying its neighbors with threats of using nuclear weapons. 
Another helpful factor is that the ban treaty movement can build on the existing 
disarmament regime, in which all but four countries—Israel, India, Pakistan, and 
North Korea—already participate. Of those four, India and Pakistan abstained in the 
October voting on the ban treaty. Their abstentions must be considered positive signs 
for a ban treaty’s prospects for achieving total disarmament. China, meanwhile, 
abstained as well. This can be read as a statement that Beijing is unafraid of a world 
without nuclear weapons even though it has the privilege of official nuclear weapon 
status. 
Another interesting abstention is that of the Netherlands, a member of NATO—every 
other member of which voted against the resolution. The Netherlands is also one of 
five European countries that, as part of NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing agreement, 
host tactical nuclear weapons belonging to the United States. Perhaps the 
Netherlands’ abstention represents a chink in the armor that the United States and 
several other nuclear-armed countries have established to protect their nuclear 
weapons from the ban treaty initiative. 
Would a ban treaty be sufficient to eliminate nuclear weapons? Well, given that the 
treaty initiative is not embraced by the nations that possess most of the global nuclear 
inventory, one could argue that it will prove to be an unsuccessful endeavor. But this 
would be a shortsighted take. The ban may not end the reign of nuclear weapons on 
its own, nor do so in the foreseeable future, but it can be expected to create a universal 
stigma around nuclear weapons—signifying the beginning of the end. It would not 
be a surprise if, decades from now, the ban treaty is regarded as the foundation of a 
world free of nuclear weapons. 
 
